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HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
The exact nature of the causal relationship between telescoping and 
phantom pain remains unclear though. It has been proposed that 
a contributing factor could be the mismatch between the sensory 
feedback from the phantom and the cortical regions representing 
the limb (Flor et al., 2006). That is, the perception of an extended 
phantom continues to provide sensory feedback to the brain area 
that previously represented the amputated limb. In contrast, tele-
scoped phantoms activate brain areas remote from the original limb 
representation, and such cortical reorganization is hypothesized to 
be the cause of increased levels of phantom pain.
In recent years there has been increasing interest in research 
investigating the cognitive and neural basis of corporeal awareness 
and body ownership. One line of research in this area has focused 
on the empirical investigation of the circumstances under which 
artificial body parts or even whole bodies can be experienced as 
ones own. One of the most adopted paradigms in this regard is the 
rubber hand illusion (RHI), firstly described in modern times by 
Botvinick and Cohen (1998). In a nutshell, it demonstrates that 
simultaneous and synchronous stroking of ones unseen hand and 
an aligned visible rubber hand evokes the illusion that the rubber 
hand is part of ones own body. More recently, it has also been shown 
hat the principles underlying the RHI can generalize to whole bod-
ies. Specifically, Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) demonstrated how 
IntroductIon
Phantom limbs, that is the sensation that an amputated or missing 
limb is still attached to the body, are experienced by up to 98% of 
amputees (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998) and by about 20% 
of children with congenital limb aplasia (Melzack et al., 1997). 
Phantom limbs may be perceived as being intact and continuous 
with the stump so to resemble a normal limb. In 49–63% of cases 
however (Giummarra et al., 2007), phantom limbs are perceived as 
being “telescoped.” That is, the proximal portion of the phantom is 
perceived to be missing or have shrunken, so that the more distal 
portion of the phantom is perceived as floating near or “within” 
the stump (Flor et al., 2006). Telescoping typically begins within 
the first few weeks post-amputation (Carlen et al., 1978), but the 
complete extension of the phenomenon may take place over a 
number of years (Giummarra et al., 2007). It has been proposed 
that telescoping occurs as a consequence of the fact that the distal 
portion of any limb is more strongly represented in the cortex rela-
tive to its more proximal regions. This proposal is also supported by 
the fact that lower limbs telescope more rapidly than upper limbs 
(which are more diffusely represented throughout the cortex due to 
their integral role in fine motor tasks; Ramachandran and Hirstein, 
1998). Telescoping is also a clinically relevant phenomena as it is 
related to increased levels of phantom limb pain (Flor et al., 2006). 
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own, if they view it from a first person perspective while being 
subjected to synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.
What are the fundamental experimental conditions necessary for 
these illusions to occur? Firstly, the artificial body or body part have to 
be seen from a first person perspective and be in a plausible anatomi-
cal location and orientation with respect to the real body (Costantini 
and Haggard, 2007; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Secondly, the tactile 
stimulation of the real body(part) and the visually perceived stimula-
tion of the artificial body(part) have to occur in temporal and spatial 
synchrony, allowing for a continuous match between the visual and 
somatosensory information about the state of the body (Tsakiris and 
Haggard, 2005; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008). Thirdly, the artificial 
body or body part have to have a sufficient degree of “bodily resem-
blance” (Haans et al., 2008; Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Tsakiris et al., 
2010). Having said that though, these bodily illusions are actually 
quite malleable, in the sense that the artificial body(part) does not 
need to exactly resemble ones own in order for the illusion to occur. 
For example, Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) reported that both male 
and female participants experienced the full-body illusion involving 
a male mannequin to the same degree. Moreover, participants can 
experience a rubber hand that is much larger or smaller than theirs 
as their own (Haggard and Jundi, 2009; Bruno and Bertamini, 2010). 
Finally, people can experience illusory “duplication” of a limb, and 
feel two right rubber hands as both belonging to their body (Ehrsson, 
2009). These observations show that bodily illusions are quite robust, 
allowing for differences in gender and quite substantial deviations in 
body shape as well as body size from the real body.
In the current study we explored the robustness, constraints and 
malleability of the full-body illusion even further. Specifically, we 
set out to address two main questions: Firstly, whether it is possible 
to induce a full-body illusion using a mannequin that is missing a 
hand and whose arm resembles a stump of a hand amputee. That 
is, can healthy participants experience an amputated body as their 
own? Secondly, if this is the case, we aimed to explore the possibility 
of evoking phantom hand sensations by manipulating the perceived 
position of the participants’ hand with respect to the stump of the 
mannequin. In other words, can the full-body illusion be used to 
induce the sensation of a “telescoped” limb in healthy individu-
als? If the full-body illusion allows for such manipulations to be 
performed, this could have important theoretical as well as clinical 
implications. From a theoretical point of view, it would allow to fur-
ther explore the constraints of bodily illusions and the plasticity of 
body representation. From a clinical perspective, it would represent a 
platform for the investigation the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying telescoping in amputees, and potentially even shed light 
on the relationship between telescoping and phantom pain.
MaterIals and Methods
PartIcIPants
Sixteen naive volunteers participated in each of the experiments. 
Experiment 1: Age: 26–39, Mean = 31.8; Sex: 9 male, 7 female; 
Handedness: 15 right-handed, 1 left-handed. Experiment 2: Age: 
23–66, Mean = 31.8; Sex: 6 male, 10 female; Handedness: 15 right-
handed, 1 left-handed. Experiment 3: Age: 22–38, Mean = 27.31; 
Sex: 7 male, 9 female; Handedness: 15 right-handed, 1 left-handed. 
Handedness was assessed with the Edinburgh inventory for hand-
edness (Oldfield, 1971). None of the participants had a history of 
head injury or any other neurological condition, and all had normal 
(or with contact lenses corrected) vision. The study was approved 
by the Ethics Committee of the Karolinska Institute, and informed 
written consent was obtained from all participants.
exPerIMental setuP and basIc exPerIMental desIgn
The experimental setup and basic experimental design were based 
on those described by Petkova and Ehrsson (2008).
Head-mounted displays and CCTV cameras
During all three experiments, participants wore a set of head-
mounted displays (HMDs; Cybermind Visette Pro PAL, Cybermind 
Interactive, Maastricht, the Netherlands) with a field of view of 71.5° 
and a display resolution of 640 × 480. The HMDs were connected to 
two synchronized color CCTV cameras (Panasonic WV-CP484E), 
which were attached to a helmet worn by a mannequin, and posi-
tioned so as to record the mannequin’s body from above (Figure 1). 
Thus, when looking down toward their own body through the 
HMDs, participants saw the mannequin’s body instead. The cameras 
were attached side-by side at a distance of 10 cm, with their position 
corresponding to that of the mannequin’s eyes. The images from the 
left and right video cameras were projected onto the left and right 
Figure 1 | experimental setup. (A) For the induction of the full-body illusion synchronous strokes were applied to the participants and the mannequin, while the 
participants were viewing the mannequin’s body through a set of HMDs. (B) View of the mannequin’s body, which was missing its left hand, from the participants’ 
perspective.
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1–5 cm. An irregular pattern of stroking was used to avoid expec-
tations about the timing of the visuo-tactile stimulation events in 
the participants.
Stroking of the left hand – induction of specific experimental effects
Stroking of the torso and the right hand was followed by a 
1-min session of simultaneous stroking of the participants’ left 
hand and the mannequin’s stump. As above, strokes were always 
applied in temporal synchrony. With regard to the spatial loca-
tion of the strokes however, there were two different experimen-
tal conditions: (1) Simultaneous stroking of the participant’s 
hand and the empty space below the mannequin’s stump in 
spatially corresponding locations, so that there was an exact 
overlap of the strokes felt on the unseen hand and the strokes 
seen in empty space below the mannequin’s stump; in this mode 
of stimulation the participants’ wrist coincided with the end of 
the mannequin’s stump. (2) Simultaneous stroking of the par-
ticipant’s hand and the end of the mannequin’s stump, so that 
the felt and seen strokes occurred with an offset of approximately 
15 cm; in this mode of stimulation the participants’ fingertips 
coincided with the end of the mannequin’s stump (Figure 2). In 
Condition 1, the strokes applied to the empty space below the 
mannequin’s stump were carefully monitored so as to resemble 
the shape and size of each participant’s hand as closely as pos-
sible. In Condition 2, particular emphasis was given on simulta-
neously touching the participants’ fingertips and the very end of 
the mannequin’s stump. Participants experienced each condition 
once in counterbalanced order. In between each condition the 
HMDs were removed, and participants were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire in regard to their experience during the stroking 
(see below).
Questionnaire
Following each stroking session, consisting of a total of 3-min 
stroking of the torso, the right hand and then the left hand 
(Condition 1 or 2), participants were asked to complete a ques-
tionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of 12 statements describing 
possible perceptual effects that might be elicited by the stroking, 
and participants were asked to affirm or deny experiencing each 
side of the HMDs respectively, allowing for a true   stereoscopic image. 
In addition, the CCTV camera signals were directly relayed into the 
HMDs without any external conversion devices, hence participants 
viewed the recordings with no noticeable delay.
Mannequin
A male mannequin, dressed with blue jeans and a white T-shirt, 
was used for both male and female participants in all experi-
ments. This choice was based on the fact that Petkova and Ehrsson 
(2008) did not find any gender effects in any of their full-body 
illusion experiments. Crucially for the experimental manipulations 
described below, in our setup the mannequin was missing its left 
hand. Hence, the mannequin’s left arm resembled a “stump” of left 
hand amputees (Figure 1).
Induction of the full-body illusion
Participants  wore  the  HMDs  connected  to  CCTV  cameras  as 
described above. They assumed a standing position and were asked 
to tilt their head forward as if they were looking down at their own 
body, so that they viewed the mannequin’s body from a first person 
perspective. In order to induce a full-body illusion, namely the expe-
rience of perceiving the mannequin’s body as one’s own, partici-
pants were then subjected to synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation 
through stroking. That is, the experimenter simultaneously stroked 
the participants’ body (which was out of view) and the mannequin’s 
body (which was in full view). Hence, participants experienced the 
visual stimulation seen on the mannequin corresponding to the 
tactile stimulation felt on their own bodies. In all three experiments, 
stroking was initially performed on the torso and the right hand (to 
induce the full-body illusion), and subsequently on the left hand (to 
induce the specific effects of each experimental condition). Details 
about the exact duration and characteristics of the stroking in each 
of the experimental conditions are provided below.
exPerIMent 1
Stroking of the torso and right hand – induction of the full-body 
illusion
The induction of the full-body illusion was performed by a 1-min 
stroking session of the torso, followed by a 1-min stroking ses-
sion of the right forearm and hand. Approximately 60 strokes 
Figure 2 | Stroking conditions. (A) Condition 1: Simultaneous stroking of the 
participant’s hand and the empty space below the mannequin’s stump, so as to 
make the participant’s wrist coincide with the end of the mannequin’s stump. 
(B) Condition 2: Simultaneous stroking of the participant’s hand and the end of the 
mannequin’s stump, so as to make the participant’s fingertips coincide with the end 
of the mannequin’s stump. The red circles indicate the area on which simultaneous 
strokes were applied, and the arrows indicate the point of the arm of the participant 
that was touched at the same time as the end of the mannequin’s stump.
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Stroking of the left hand was performed following the exact same 
procedure as described in Experiment 1 for both Condition 1 and 
Condition 2. Participants experienced each condition three times 
in a counterbalanced order. At the end of each stroking session, 
participants performed a visual judgment task (see below).
Visual judgment task
After each stroking session, consisting of a total of 2-min stroking 
of the torso, the right hand and then the left hand (Condition 1 
or 2), participants were asked to perform a visual judgment task 
in which they had to visually judge the perceived location of their 
left fingertips. The purpose of this task was to obtain a objec-
tive measure of the experimental effect found in Experiment 1, 
namely the difference in the perceived position of the left hand 
in Condition 1 (below the stump) vs. Condition 2 (“inside” the 
stump). The task was performed as follows: After each stroking 
session participants were asked to look at “their” left arm, that is 
the left stump of the mannequin, through the HMDs. Then, the 
experimenter moved a ruler from the floor up toward the stump, 
and participants verbally instructed the experimenter to adjust the 
height of the ruler to the perceived location of their left fingertips. 
The absolute height of the position was then manually recorded by 
the experimenter on a measuring band attached to the wall next to 
which the participant was standing (measurements were rounded 
up to 0.5 cm). A spirit level ruler was used in order to assure the its 
horizontal alignment when recording the height on the measure-
ment band (Figure 4). The crucial question of interest was whether 
there would be a significant difference in the visually judged height 
effect on a seven-point Likert scale. Two statements were intended 
to capture the overall illusory experience of perceiving the man-
nequin’s body as one’s own, two statements were intended to 
capture the perceived location of the left hand expected to occur 
in each condition, and one statement referred to the perceived 
length of the left arm. For each of these statements intending to 
capture illusory sensations, there was a control statement aimed 
at capturing the participants’ suggestibility and task compliance. 
Lastly, two remaining statements referred to sensations of pain, 
numbness, burning or pins and needles, which we thought could 
potentially be experienced by participants during the illusion 
(Figure 3). The order of the questions was randomized across 
participants to avoid any order effects. The crucial measures of 
interest were whether participants reported to have experienced 
the full-body illusion during the stroking sessions, and if they 
did whether they perceived their left hand to be located in a dif-
ferent position with respect to the stump of the mannequin in 
Condition 1 vs. Condition 2.
exPerIMent 2
Stroking of the torso and right hand – induction of the full-body 
illusion
The induction of the full-body illusion was performed following 
the same procedure as in Experiment 1, except that the stroking of 
the torso as well as the stroking of the right forearm and hand were 
shortened to 30 s. The decision to shorten the stroking duration was 
taken following subjective reports of participants in Experiment 
1, indicating that halving the stroking duration would still be suf-
ficient to induce the full-body illusion.
Figure 3 | experiment 1 – Questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of 
12 statements referring to differential aspects of the perceptual experience 
induced by the stroking sessions: Experience of the full-body illusion 
(Statements 1–4); Perceived location of the left hand (Statements 5–8); 
Perceived length of the left arm (Statements 9–10); Sensations of pain, 
numbness, burning or pins and needles, which could potentially be experienced 
by participants during the illusion (Statements 11-12). Participants were asked to 
affirm or deny each statement on a seven-point Likert scale (+3 = strongly agree; 
−3 = strongly disagree) – the graph shows the mean group values with standard 
error bars. Wilcoxon signed rank tests were performed between illusion 
statements and control statements, as well as between Condition 1 and 
Condition 2 – for more details see section “Methods and Results. ” *p < 0.05.
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interest were whether participants reported to have experienced the 
full-body illusion during the stroking sessions, and if they did whether 
they perceived their left hand to be located in a different position with 
respect to the stump of the mannequin in Condition 1 vs. Condition 2.
exPerIMent 3
Stroking of the torso and right hand – induction of the full-body 
illusion
The induction of the full-body illusion was performed following 
the exact same procedure as in Experiment 2.
of the   perceived position of the left fingertips following the two 
stroking   conditions, reflecting the subjectively reported difference 
observed in Experiment 1.
Questionnaire
Following the six experimental sessions involving stroking and the vis-
ual judgment task, participants were given a short break during which 
the HMDs were removed. Then, the experimental setup was resumed, 
and participants experienced each stroking condition one more time 
in a counterbalanced order. After each condition, participants were 
asked to complete a shortened version of the questionnaire used in 
Figure 4 | experiment 2 – Visual judgment task. (A) At the end of each stroking session participants were asked to judge the perceived height of their fingertips 
by verbally instructing the experimenter to adjust the height of a ruler. (B) Mean height of the perceived position of the finger tips in the IH and TH condition (paired 
samples t-test – p < 0.001).
Figure 5 | experiment 2 – Questionnaire. Shortened version of the 
questionnaire used in Experiment 1 consisting of eight statements: Experience 
of the full-body illusion (Statements 1–2); Perceived location of the left hand 
(Statements 3–6); Perceived length of the left arm (Statements 7–8); Participants 
were asked to affirm or deny each statement on a seven-point Likert scale 
(+3 = strongly agree; −3 = strongly disagree) – the graph shows the mean group 
values with standard error bars. Wilcoxon signed rank tests were performed 
between illusion statements and control statements, as well as between the IH 
and TH conditions – for more details see section “Methods and Results. ” 
*p < 0.05.
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each stroking session, participants were asked to point toward the 
tip of their left thumb with their right index finger, by continuing 
to move until their right index finger touched the plexiglass board 
(Figure 6). During all pointing movements, the participants’ vision 
was occluded (by temporarily cutting the electricity supply to the 
CCTV cameras) in order to exclude any reliance on visual reference 
points to guide the pointing movements. The crucial question of 
interest was whether the difference in perceived hand position in 
Condition 1 vs. Condition 2 observed in the previous experiments, 
would be reflected by a difference in pointing before vs. after the 
stroking sessions in the respective conditions.
Questionnaire
Following the six experimental sessions involving stroking and the 
pointing task, participants were given a short break during which the 
HMDs were removed. Then, the experimental setup was resumed, 
and participants experienced each stroking condition one more 
time in a counterbalanced order. After each condition, participants 
were asked to complete the same questionnaire as the one used in 
Experiment 2 (Figure 7). Again, the crucial measures of interest were 
whether participants reported to have experienced the full-body illu-
sion during the stroking sessions, and if they did whether they per-
ceived their left hand to be located in a different position with respect 
to the stump of the mannequin in Condition 1 vs. Condition 2.
data analysIs
All the data acquired in the three experiments was tested for normal 
distribution using the Shapiro–Wilk test. The data obtained from 
the questionnaires did not pass the test for normality in any of 
the experiments, hence non-parametric statistics were used for all 
analyses of questionnaire data. In contrast, the data obtained from 
the visual judgment task and the pointing task did pass the test for 
normality, hence parametric statistics were used for the analysis of 
proprioceptive drift measures. All analyses were based on a priory 
hypotheses, and hence consisted of planned comparisons. For ques-
tionnaire data, comparisons were performed between the illusion 
questions and their respective control questions, or between the 
Stroking of the left hand – induction of specific experimental effects
Stroking of the left hand was performed following the exact same 
procedure as described in the previous two experiments for both 
Condition 1 and Condition 2. Again, participants experienced 
each condition three times in a counterbalanced order. Before and 
after each stroking session, participants performed a pointing task 
(see below).
Pointing task
Before and after each stroking session, consisting of a total of 
2-min stroking of the torso, the right hand and then the left hand 
(Condition 1 or 2), participants were asked to perform a pointing 
task in which they had to point to the perceived position of their 
left thumb. The purpose of this task was to obtain an objective 
motoric measure of the proprioceptive drift of the left hand in 
Condition 1 (when the hand is perceived to be below the stump) 
vs. Condition 2 (when the hand is perceived to be “inside” the 
stump). In contrast to the visual judgment task, during the pointing 
movements all visual cues were removed, so that the proprioceptive 
drift measure would reflect an effect based on proprioceptive infor-
mation alone. The setup and procedure of the pointing task were 
as follows: Pointing movements were recorded using a FASTRAK 
electromagnetic motion tracking system (Polhemus, Colchester, 
VT, USA). The FASTRAK system consists of a transmitter and two 
small sensors, and allows the tracking of the position (x, y, and z 
Cartesian coordinates) and orientation (azimuth, elevation, and 
roll) of the sensors with respect to the transmitter as they move 
through space. During the movement data is recorded at a fre-
quency of 60 Hz. Sensor 1 was placed on the participants’ right 
index finger, and used to track the pointing movement. Sensor 2 was 
placed below the participants’ left elbow, and used to monitor the 
participant’s position in space during the experiment. In addition 
to the FASTRAK equipment, a plexiglass board was placed on the 
inside of the participants’ left hand, and used to provide a constant 
horizontal end point for the pointing movement. Participants were 
positioned so that their left hand was placed at a distance of about 
10 cm from the plexiglass board, and the height of their thumb was 
marked on the board so that they could be adjusted to the exact 
Figure 6 | experiment 3 – Pointing task. (A) Before and after each stroking 
session participants were asked to point toward the tip of their left thumb with their 
right index finger. A sensor (right index finger) was used to measure the pointing 
movement and a second sensor (left elbow) was used to monitor the participant’s 
position in space during the experiment. Cameras were occluded during each 
pointing movement to exclude reliance on visual information. (B) Proprioceptive 
drift for the IH and TH condition as measured by the difference in pointing before vs. 
after the induction of the illusion (paired samples t-test – p < 0.001).
Schmalzl and Ehrsson  Illusion of a telescoped limb
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  April 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 34  |  6(a)  Experience of the full-body illusion (Illusion statements 1–2, 
Control statements 3–4)
Following  both  Condition  1  and  Condition  2,  partici-
pants  clearly  affirmed  experiencing  the  full-body  illusion 
(Illusion statements mean score vs. control statements mean   
score – Wilcoxon signed rank test: Condition 1: Z = −3.481, 
p < 0.001; Condition 2: Z = −3.521, p < 0.001). There was 
no difference in the perceived strength of the full-body illu-
sion in the two conditions (Condition 1 vs. Condition 2 – 
Wilcoxon signed rank test: Illusion statements mean score: 
Z  =  −1.261,  p  =  0.207;  Control  statements  mean  score: 
Z = −1.628, p = 0.103).
(b) Perceived location of the left hand illusion (For Condition 
1:  Illusion  statements  5–6,  Control  statements  7–8;  For 
Condition  2:  Illusion  statements  7–8,  Control  statements 
5–6)
There was a significant difference in the perceived position of 
the left hand in the two stroking conditions. In Condition 1, 
participants clearly affirmed that they perceived their hand 
to be located below the stump, with their wrist being in the 
same position as the end of the stump of the mannequin 
(Illusion statements mean score vs. control statements mean 
score – Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −3.532, p < 0.001). In 
Condition 2, participants clearly affirmed that they percei-
ved their hand to be located “inside” the stump, with their 
left fingertips being in the same position as the end of the 
stump of the mannequin (Illusion statements mean score vs. 
control statements mean score – Wilcoxon signed rank test: 
two stroking conditions (Condition 1 and Condition 2 described 
above), using Wilcoxon signed rank tests. For proprioceptive drift 
measures, comparisons were performed between the two strok-
ing conditions using paired samples t-tests. Since all analyses were 
based on a priory hypotheses, no post hoc corrections for multiple 
comparisons were performed. For all analyses, alpha was set to 0.05.
results
exPerIMent 1
Aim
Experiment 1 had two main aims. Firstly, we aimed to investigate 
whether it is possible to induce a full-body illusion involving the 
use of a mannequin that is missing a limb, that is whether par-
ticipants would accept a body resembling that of a hand amputee 
as their own. Secondly, if this is the case, we aimed to investigate 
whether during the full-body illusion it is possible to manipulate 
the perceived location of the participants’ hand with respect to the 
stump of the mannequin.
Questionnaire results
As mentioned in section “Materials and Methods,” the statements of 
the questionnaire referred to three distinct aspects of the perceptual 
experience induced by the stroking sessions: (a) Experience of the 
full-body illusion, (b) Perceived location of the left hand, and (c) 
Perceived length of the left arm. The comparison between illusion 
and control statements, as well as the comparisons between strok-
ing conditions for each of these aspects was therefore performed 
independently (Figure 3).
Figure 7 | experiment 3 – Questionnaire. Shortened version of the 
questionnaire used in Experiment 1 consisting of eight statements: Experience 
of the full-body illusion (Statements 1–2); Perceived location of the left hand 
(Statements 3–6); Perceived length of the left arm (Statements 7–8); Participants 
were asked to affirm or deny each statement on a seven-point Likert scale 
(+3 = strongly agree; −3 = strongly disagree) – the graph shows the mean group 
values with standard error bars. Wilcoxon signed rank tests were performed 
between illusion statements and control statements, as well as between the IH 
and TH conditions – for more details see section “Methods and Results. ” 
*p < 0.05.
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Z  =  −0.577,  p  =  0.564;  Control  statement:  Z  =  −0.276, 
p = 0.783).
(b) Perceived location of the left hand illusion (For Condition 
1:  Illusion  statements  3–4,  Control  statements  5–6;  For 
Condition  2:  Illusion  statements  5–6,  Control  statements 
3–4)
Again,  the  participants’  responses  mirrored  those  of 
Experiment 1. In the IH condition, participants clearly affir-
med that they perceived their hand to be located below the 
stump, with their wrist being in the same position as the end 
of the stump of the mannequin (Illusion statements mean 
score vs. control statements mean score – Wilcoxon signed 
rank test: Z = −3.591, p < 0.001). In the TH condition, parti-
cipants clearly affirmed that they perceived their hand to be 
located “inside” the stump, with their left fingertips being in 
the same position as the end of the stump of the mannequin 
(Illusion statements mean score vs. control statements mean 
score – Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −3.653, p < 0.001). 
When  comparing  the  participants’  responses  between  the 
IH and TH conditions, there was a significant difference for 
both the mean score of the statements referring to the hand 
being perceived below the stump (Wilcoxon signed rank test: 
Z = −3.575, p < 0.001), and the mean score of the statements 
referring  to  the  hand  being  perceived “inside”  the  stump 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −3.654, p < 0.001).
(c)  Perceived length of the left arm (Illusion statement 7, Control 
statement 8)
Compared to Experiment 1, participants showed an increa-
sed tendency to affirm experiencing their left arm as being 
shorter than their right arm in the TH condition. However, 
the average response (although above 0) did not differ signi-
ficantly from that in the IH condition (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test: Z = −1.450, p = 0.147). As in Experiment 1 though, par-
ticipants responded more positively to the illusion statement 
(i.e., my left arm felt shorter) than to the control statement 
(i.e., my left arm felt lighter) in the TH condition (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test: Z = −2.271, p = 0.023), whereas this was 
not the case in the IH condition (Wilcoxon signed rank test: 
Z = −0.360, p = 0.719).
exPerIMent 3
Aim
As in Experiment 2, the main aim of Experiment 3 was to obtain 
an objective measure of the proprioceptive drift of the left hand 
in the IH vs. the TH conditions. In contrast to the visual judg-
ment task however, in this experiment participants had to manually 
indicate the perceived location of their left hand with no available 
visual cues.
Pointing task results
The proprioceptive drift was measured by the difference of the 
height to which participants pointed before vs. after the stroking 
sessions in the TH as well as the IH conditions. In line with our 
prediction, the proprioceptive drift, measured by the difference of 
the position of Sensor 1, was significantly larger in the TH condition 
compared to the IH condition (paired samples t-test: t = −4.086, 
Z = −3.551, p < 0.001). When comparing the participants’ 
responses between Conditions 1 and 2, there was a significant 
difference for both the mean score of the statements referring 
to the hand being perceived below the stump (Wilcoxon sig-
ned rank test: Z = −3.544, p < 0.001), and the mean score of 
the statements referring to the hand being perceived “inside” 
the stump (Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −3.533, p < 0.001).
(c)  Perceived length of the left arm (Illusion statement 9, Control 
statement 10)
Participants  did  not  affirm  experiencing  their  left  arm  to 
be shorter than their right arm in either of the conditions. 
However, participants responded more positively to the illu-
sion statement (i.e., my left arm felt shorter) than to the con-
trol statement (i.e., my left arm felt lighter) in Condition 2 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −2.205, p = 0.027), whereas 
this was not the case in Condition 1 (Wilcoxon signed rank 
test: Z = −1.711, p = 0.087).
(d) Sensations of pain, numbness, burning or pins and needles 
(Statements 11–12)
Participants did not affirm experiencing any pain or sensa-
tions such as numbness, burning or pins and needles in either 
of the conditions.
exPerIMent 2
Aim
The  main  aim  of  Experiment  2  was  to  obtain  a  more  objec-
tive measure of the experimental effect found in Experiment 1, 
namely the difference in the perceived position of the left hand 
in Condition 1 (below the stump) vs. Condition 2 (“inside” the 
stump). Specifically, the aim was to investigate whether there would 
be a significant difference in the visually judged height of the per-
ceived position of the left fingertips following the two stroking 
conditions. Given the results of the subjective reports in Experiment 
1, hereafter Condition 1 will be referred to as “invisible hand condi-
tion” (IH) and Condition 2 will be referred to as “telescoped hand 
condition” (TH).
Visual judgment task results
The results of the visual judgment task showed a significant differ-
ence in the visually judged height of the perceived position of the 
left fingertips in the TH vs. IH condition (paired samples t-test: 
t = 20.800, p < 0.001; Figure 4).
Questionnaire results
As in Experiment 1, the comparison between illusion and control 
statements, as well as the comparisons between stroking condi-
tions for each of the aspects addressed by the questionnaire was 
performed independently 1 (Figure 5).
(a)  Experience  of  the  full-body  illusion  (Illusion  statement  1, 
Control statement 2)
As in Experiment 1, following both the IH and TH condi-
tions,  participants  clearly  affirmed  experiencing  the  full-
body  illusion  (Illusion  vs.  control  statement  –  Wilcoxon 
signed rank test: IH: Z = −3.496, p < 0.001; TH: Z = −3.618, 
p < 0.001). Also, there was no difference in the perceived 
strength of the full-body illusion in the two conditions (IH vs.   
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control statement (i.e., my left arm felt lighter) in the TH 
condition (Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −2.983, p = 0.003), 
whereas this was not the case in the IH condition (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test: Z = −0.413, p = 0.679).
dIscussIon
The current study demonstrates that the sensation of a telescoped 
hand can be induced experimentally in healthy individuals using 
a full-body illusion. Questionnaire data across all three experi-
ments showed that participants experienced an ownership illusion 
of an artificial amputee body. That is, independently of the stroking 
condition, participants experienced the mannequin’s body as their 
own even if it was missing a hand. Questionnaire data also showed 
that, depending on the stroking condition, participants affirmed 
experiencing their left hand to be located either below (“invisible 
hand”) or inside the stump of the mannequin (“telescoped hand”). 
These latter perceptual phenomena were confirmed by objective 
measures of proprioceptive drift in both a visual judgment task 
(Experiment 2) and a pointing task (Experiment 3).
Our findings are important as they establish that the brain of 
healthy individuals has the capacity to very rapidly experience own-
ership of a limb amputee’s body. Thus, they demonstrate that a 
full-body illusion can persist also in the context of such substantial 
visuo-proprioceptive incongruence between the felt and seen body. 
Moreover, our results show that in this illusory state individuals 
can experience telescoping, with the felt hand retracting into the 
seen stump of the artificial body. This is a dramatic example of how 
the multisensory mechanisms producing ownership of an entire 
body (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2010) influence 
ownership of a single limb, to the extent of overriding previous 
notions of visuo-proprioceptive constraints of limb-ownership 
referring to the fact that the owned object has to resemble a human 
hand (Tsakiris et al., 2010). In addition to these theoretically rel-
evant aspects, the present results are also important from a clinical 
perspective as they introduce a new non-invasive method for the 
potential manipulation of painful telescoped phantom limbs in 
amputees.
The present findings represent a major advance with respect to 
earlier studies reporting illusory elongation or shrinking of limbs. 
In these earlier reports it has been described how perceived arm 
length can be experimentally manipulated through discordant 
tactile input to both arms (Craske et al., 1984), or trough muscle 
tendon vibration (de Vignemont et al., 2005; Longo et al., 2009). 
In these studies participants always have their eyes closed while 
conflicting tactile and proprioceptive stimulation was provided to 
two body parts (or two muscle tendons in the case of Longo et al., 
2009). The present study is different as the telescoping occurred 
while participants experienced a full-body illusion during which 
they saw an amputated stump, and while the tactile stimulation 
was only delivered to one body part (their unseen hand). Thus, the 
mechanisms involved in the current illusory telescoping phenom-
enon are likely to be different. Unlike the previous experiments, 
the present telescoping effect results from multisensory process-
ing related to the feeling of ownership of an artificial body, and 
from the integration of visual information from a seen stump and 
somatosensory information from ones unseen hand.
p < 0.001). We further used one sample t-tests to evaluate whether 
the drift was significantly different from 0 when considering the 
data from each condition separately. The results showed a signifi-
cant proprioceptive drift in the TH condition (t = −7.305, p < 0.001) 
but not in the IH condition (t = 0.997, p = 0.344). Importantly, 
no such differences was observed for Sensor 2, excluding that the 
proprioceptive drift in the TH condition was simply caused by the 
participants moving during the experiment (paired samples t-test: 
t = −0.196, p = 0.136; Figure 6).
Questionnaire results
As in the previous experiments, the comparison between illusion 
and control statements, as well as the comparisons between stroking 
conditions for each of the aspects addressed by the questionnaire 
was performed independently (Figure 7).
(a)  Experience  of  the  full-body  illusion  (Illusion  statement  1, 
Control statement 2)
Again,  participants  clearly  affirmed  experiencing  the  full-
body illusion in both the IH and TH conditions (Illusion 
vs.  control  statement  –  Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test:  IH: 
Z = −3.570, p < 0.001; TH: Z = −3.495, p < 0.001). The per-
ceived strength of the full-body illusion did also not differ in 
the two conditions (IH vs. TH – Wilcoxon signed rank test: 
Illusion statement: Z = −0.276, p = 0.783; Control statement: 
Z = −0.447, p = 0.655).
(b) Perceived location of the left hand illusion (For Condition 
1:  Illusion  statements  3–4,  Control  statements  5–6;  For 
Condition  2:  Illusion  statements  5–6,  Control  statements 
3–4)
The participants’ responses replicated those of the previous 
experiments. In the IH condition, participants clearly affir-
med that they perceived their hand to be located below the 
stump, with their wrist being in the same position as the end 
of the stump of the mannequin (Illusion statements mean 
score vs. control statements mean score – Wilcoxon signed 
rank test: Z = −3.570, p < 0.001). In the TH condition, parti-
cipants clearly affirmed that they perceived their hand to be 
located “inside” the stump, with their left fingertips being in 
the same position as the end of the stump of the mannequin 
(Illusion statements mean score vs. control statements mean 
score – Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −3.495, p < 0.001). 
When  comparing  the  participants’  responses  between  the 
IH and TH conditions, there was a significant difference for 
both the mean score of the statements referring to the hand 
being perceived below the stump (Wilcoxon signed rank test: 
Z = −3.526, p < 0.001), and the mean score of the statements 
referring  to  the  hand  being  perceived “inside”  the  stump 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test: Z = −3.533, p < 0.001).
(c)  Perceived length of the left arm (Illusion statement 7, Control 
statement 8)
Contrary to the previous experiments, participants affirmed 
experiencing their left arm as being shorter than their right 
arm in the TH condition, with the average rating differing 
significantly  from  that  of  in  the  IH  condition  (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test: Z = −3.060, p = 0.002). As in the previous 
experiments, participants responded more positively to the 
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an obvious question arises: How far could one take this kind of 
illusory experience? Firstly, in a “quantitative” sense – how much 
of the mannequin’s body could be missing for one to still accept it 
as ones own? For example, could the illusion still be induced if the 
mannequin was missing a whole arm, both arms, etc.? Secondly, in 
a more “qualitative” sense – does the ease with which the illusion 
can be induced depend on the specific body part that is missing 
from the mannequin? For example, would one just as easily accept 
a body with a missing leg as one with a missing hand? Thirdly, does 
the amputation of the mannequin have to be physically plausible? 
That is, what about a scenario in which the mannequin has as a 
missing or invisible torso? There certainly are plenty of interesting 
questions to be addressed by future investigations further exploring 
the constraints of bodily illusions.
PlastIcIty of body rePresentatIon
Both the general demonstration of the full-body illusion in the 
context of a missing limb, as well as the specific demonstration 
of the illusion of a telescoped limb, make the case for a remark-
able degree of plasticity of our body representation. What kind 
of body representation though? Body representation as such is a 
loose term, which can refer to different concepts. A distinction 
often made in the literature is that between body schema and body 
image (Schwoebel and Coslett, 2004; Kammers et al., 2006, 2010; 
de Vignemont, 2010). In brief, according to this distinction body 
schema refers to a dynamic representation of the current position 
of body parts relative to one another, which is derived from multiple 
sensory and motor inputs (e.g., visual, tactile, and proprioceptive 
information), and that interacts with motor systems in the genesis 
of actions. Body image in contrast refers to the perceptual dimen-
sions of how we experience our body, sometimes referring also to 
lexical and semantic notions.
There is ongoing controversy in the literature about the exact 
distinction between, and taxonomy of, different types of body rep-
resentation (de Vignemont, 2010). While a more detailed discussion 
of this topic is beyond the scope of the current manuscript, we 
would nevertheless like to point out that when looked at within this 
general framework, the results of our study demonstrate plasticity 
in a number of ways. The results of the pointing task for example, 
reflecting a change in the sensory proprioceptive representation 
of the current position of ones hand following an only very short 
time of experimental manipulation, is likely to reflect plasticity 
of the body schema. The visual judgment task on the other hand, 
in which participants had to visually judge the perceived position 
of their hand with respect to the stump of the mannequin, taps 
more into body image. Lastly, and in more general terms, the mere 
fact that healthy participants affirmed to experience an amputated 
body as their own, shows that even the long-term representation 
of our body image (consisting of an intact body having two hands 
and two feet), is not necessarily set in stone at any given moment.
neural correlates of Illusory telescoPIng sensatIons
What are the neural mechanisms underlying the illusory experi-
ence of a telescoped limb? In recent years, a number of studies 
have shed light on the neural correlates of bodily illusions and 
the perceived ownership of artificial body parts or whole bodies. 
constraInts of bodIly IllusIons
One theoretically relevant aspect of the current study concerns 
the constraints of bodily illusions. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, previous studies have demonstrated the malleability of bodily 
illusions, in the sense that they allow for the artificial body(part) 
to deviate quite substantially from the real body(part) in shape as 
well as size (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Haggard and Jundi, 2009; 
Bruno and Bertamini, 2010). However, to our knowledge this is 
the first demonstration of a bodily illusion in which the deviation 
goes as far as a missing limb. In that, it was surprising to observe 
that all participants experienced the full-body illusion, as shown 
by the high agreement ratings for the overall body illusion state-
ment in all three experiments. That is, all participants accepted the 
body of the amputated mannequin as their own, irrespectively of 
the IH or TH stroking conditions. Although we did not perform a 
direct comparison with an intact mannequin in the current study, 
a comparison of the ratings of the current study with those of 
Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) do not indicate any reduction in the 
overall full-body illusion strength. The robustness of this illusory 
experience is a quite remarkable finding in itself. Of course, people 
who undergo amputations in real life are also put into the situ-
ation of suddenly experiencing their body with a missing limb, 
so in principle the illusion recreates a plausible real life scenario. 
However, the fact that healthy participants can have such strong 
illusory sensations of owning an amputated body, while still con-
tinuing to “proprioceptively” experience their intact body and sense 
their own hand, is intriguing.
The strength and robustness of the illusory acceptance of the 
amputated body is further evidenced if one considers the nature of 
the stroking in the IH and TH conditions. As described in section 
“Materials and Methods,” in the IH hand condition simultane-
ous strokes were applied to the end of the mannequin’s stump 
(corresponding to the mannequin’s wrist) and the participant’s 
wrist. In contrast, in the TH condition simultaneous strokes were 
applied end of the mannequin’s stump (corresponding to the 
mannequin’s wrist) and the participant’s fingertips. In princi-
ple, this represents a spatial asynchrony, which is known to dis-
rupt or at least drastically reduce illusory sensations for the RHI 
(Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson et al., 2008). However, for 
the full-body illusion this did not seem to be the case. How can 
this be explained? Well, in the context of our full-body illusion, 
there was spatial congruence between visual, somatosensory and 
proprioceptive information for all body parts, except the visually 
missing limb. Consequently, the most likely explanation is that 
the strength of an overall experienced bodily coherence is suf-
ficient for the illusion to persist even if there is a mismatch for an 
individual body part. This argument is in line with the findings 
of Petkova and Ehrsson (2008), who showed that synchronous 
stimulation of one single body part (i.e., the hand or abdomen) 
is sufficient to evoke ownership of the entire body. In discussing 
this finding, the authors refer to the concept of a central body 
representation consisting of a “map of connected nodes,” in which 
the representations of individual body parts from a continuous 
whole. In case of sensory conflict regarding one of the nodes, our 
perceptual systems tend to solve it by producing a single “solution” 
driven by the priority of maintaining an overall sense of bodily 
coherence in the best possible way (Lackner, 1988).
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1998). A possible way of testing this hypothesis in an experimental 
setting would be to adopt the full-body illusion as in the current 
study, but attempt to induce illusory telescoping sensations of upper 
as well as lower limbs. One could then directly compare the time 
needed to induce the illusion for different limbs. Under the assump-
tion that the present illusory telescoping in healthy individuals 
shares some of the mechanisms of telescoping in amputees, one 
would expect that it takes less time to induce the sensation of a 
telescoped lower than upper limb.
Secondly, a brief note in regard to the proposed location of 
shrinking of the phantom limb in amputees. As said above, it has 
been proposed that it is the proximal part of the limb that shrinks, 
with a consequently perceived displacement of the distal part (i.e., 
the phantom hand retracted within the stump). The converging 
results of our three experiments clearly indicate that participants 
perceived an actual displacement of their left hand. Moreover, 
according to questionnaire responses, in Experiment 3 participants 
also perceived their left arm to be shorter than their right arm. 
However, on the basis of our current data we cannot conclude 
whether the perceived displacement of the hand reflects an actual 
perceived shrinkage of the arm, and if so which exact part of the 
arm is perceived to shrink. One way of assessing this would be to 
use the pointing task of the current study, but have participants 
point to different locations of their arm such as the wrist, elbow, 
upper arm, etc. This would allow one to investigate whether the 
proprioceptive drift is restricted to the hand, or whether (and to 
which extent) would also be observed for other parts of the arm.
A third aspect that could be reproduced experimentally concerns 
two differential manifestations of telescoping. The most commonly 
described manifestation of telescoping refers to the displacement of 
a component of a phantom limb over time, eventually reaching an 
“end point” (Giummarra et al., 2007). However, in some cases the 
phenomenon has also been described to occur dynamically, with 
phantoms rapidly telescoping due to external events such as tactile 
stimulation of the stump or during active voluntary movements of 
the phantom (Poeck, 1964). It is likely that the present illusion in 
healthy individuals shares more common processes with this latter 
dynamic version of the telescoping phenomenon in amputees. In 
follow up experiments it would be interesting to investigate this by 
looking at whether it is possible to actively “pull the invisible hand 
in and out” within the same stroking session, while the participant 
keeps viewing the stump of the mannequin. Pilot experiments with 
members of our lab indeed suggest that this manipulation works 
very well, but these preliminary findings need to be substantiated 
in experiments with naïve participants.
clInIcal relevance
To conclude, we would like to discuss one of the potential clinical 
implications of the current study. As mentioned in the introduction, 
in amputees telescoping seems to be related to increased levels of 
phantom pain (Flor et al., 2006), and it has been hypothesized that 
this is due the mismatch between the sensory feedback from the tel-
escoped phantom and the original somatosensory representation of 
the hand (Flor et al., 2006). Overall, according to our questionnaire 
data, the experimentally induced illusion of a telescoped hand was 
not accompanied by any pain sensations. Nevertheless, given the 
In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, Ehrsson 
et al. (2004) showed that the RHI is mainly driven by the activity 
of multisensory areas in intraparietal cortices, as well as by activity 
in the premotor cortices, which seem to be particularly involved in 
the self-attribution aspect of the illusion. More recently, Petkova 
et al. (2010) showed that the same brain regions are also involved 
in the full-body ownership illusion.
In regard to perceptual changes of the size and shape of body 
parts, Ehrsson et al. (2005) investigated the neural correlates of the 
illusory experience of a feeling of shrinking of the waist induced 
through  muscle  tendon  vibrations.  They  found  that  illusory 
shrinking sensations were associated with activity in higher-order 
somatosensory areas in the junction between the postcentral and 
intraparietal sulci, and speculated that similar activations could 
also be expected for illusory size changes in different body parts. 
In contrast, the shrinking sensations were not associated with any 
activity in primary somatosensory or motor areas, which on the 
other hand seem to be engaged by illusory movements of individual 
limbs (Naito et al., 2002).
By relating our behavioral findings to these observations, one 
could speculate that illusory sensations of a telescoped limb could 
be mediated a combination of these two differential neural mecha-
nisms. That is, while the illusory sensation of shrinking of the arm 
might be associated with activation in higher-order somatosensory 
areas, the perceived dislocation of the hand as such could poten-
tially be reflected by a change in activation in primary somatosen-
sory areas. With respect to telescoped phantom limbs in amputees, 
there is in fact evidence from fMRI investigations that the cortical 
representation of the phantom in primary somatosensory cortex 
(S1) changes according to its perceived location. Specifically, it 
has been shown that imagined movements of a phantom hand 
generate activation in the areas corresponding to the perceived 
location of the movement rather than the actual anatomical loca-
tion of the hand area in S1. That is, imagined movements of non-
telescoped phantoms are associated with activity in the S1 region 
of the hand, partially telescoped phantoms in the region of the 
arm and completely telescoped phantoms in the region of the 
shoulder (Flor et al., 2006). Given these findings, the intriguing 
question arises of whether similar neural mechanisms also under-
lie illusory telescoping sensations. Of course, while the above-
described cortical reorganizations reflect the brain’s long-term 
plasticity following amputation, it remains an empirical question 
of whether any short-term cortical modulation could be observed 
in an experimental setting.
theoretIcal accounts of telescoPIng In aMPutees
The experimental setup used in the current study, enabling the 
induction of illusory telescoping sensations in healthy individu-
als, could be used to test some aspects of the proposed theoretical 
accounts of telescoping in amputees. One of these aspects regards 
the correlation between detail of cortical representation and tel-
escoping speed. As mentioned in the introduction, it has been 
proposed that telescoping occurs because the proximal portions 
of the limb are less strongly represented in the cortex relative to 
the distal portions. In support of this hypothesis, lower limbs seem 
to telescope more rapidly than upper limbs, supposedly because 
they are less diffusely represented throughout the cortex due to a 
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hand as their own, and that visualizing the phantom can reduce 
phantom pain, it is feasible to hypothesize that the full-body illusion 
could be used to induce ownership sensations of an intact body in 
amputees, with the possible consequence of manipulating phan-
tom sensations. The novelty with respect to the MVF technique 
described above would be that the full-body illusion would allow 
one to directly manipulate the degree of telescoping of the phan-
tom, and to investigate to which extent this might alter phantom 
pain sensations.
conclusIon
In sum, our study demonstrates the possibility of experimentally 
inducing the sensation of a telescoped limb. This finding has a 
number of theoretical and clinical implications, and sets the scene 
for a series of potential future studies investigating the plasticity 
of body representation in healthy individuals as well as phantom 
sensations in amputees.
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relationship between telescoping and phantom pain in amputees, 
the intriguing question arises of whether the experimental setup 
used in our study could be used to investigate the nature of this link, 
and possibly to manipulate phantom pain sensations. The rationale 
for postulating the feasibility of such investigations is based on a 
number of observations from previous literature.
Firstly, with regard to the experimental setup as such, Ehrsson 
et al. (2008) demonstrated that upper limb amputees can be induced 
to experience the RHI. That is, following simultaneous stroking of 
their stump and the finger of the artificial rubber hand, amputees 
reported strong sensations of touch from the artificial hand. Given 
this finding, it is plausible to assume that ownership of an artificial 
hand could also be induced in the context of the full-body illu-
sion. Secondly, with regard to the manipulation of phantom pain 
sensations, there is evidence for the effectiveness of visual illusions. 
Specifically, it has been reported that mirror visual feedback (MVF) 
can be used to alleviate phantom pain (Ramachandran et al., 1995, 
2009; Chan et al., 2007; but see Moseley et al., 2008 for a critical 
review). In brief, during the MVF amputees are put in the position 
of viewing the reflection of their intact hand in a mirror so that 
it is optically superimposed on the felt location of their phantom 
hand. Consequently, movements performed with the intact hand 
create simultaneous illusory movements of the phantom hand, and 
such illusory sensations have been found to reduce phantom pain. 
So, based on the findings that amputees can experience a rubber 
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